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In this paper we apply GMM estimation to assess the relevance of domestic versus
external determinants of CPI inflation dynamics in a sample of OECD countries typically
classified as open economies. The analysis is based on a variant of the small open-economy
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more relevant inflation driver than the contemporaneous domestic output gap.
Key words: New Keynesian Phillips Curve, small open economies, expected terms of trade
fluctuations, inflation dynamics, GMM estimation.
JEL classification codes: C32, C52, E31, F41.
∗We would like to thank an anonymous referee, the Managing Editor George Tavlas, Kerry Patterson and the
audience at the 2nd International Conference on Small Open Economies in a Globalized World, Wilfrid Laurier
University, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada (June 2008) for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
†University of Reading, School of Economics, Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AA, United Kingdom;
a.mihailov@reading.ac.uk.
‡Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Economic Analysis Division, Otto Wagner Platz 3, A-1090 Vienna, Austria;
Fabio.Rumler@oenb.at.
§University of Linz, Department of Economics, Altenbergerstrasse 69, A-4040 Linz, Austria; Johann.
Scharler@jku.at.
1 Introduction
The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) is a key ingredient in what currently appears to
be the workhorse model for business cycle analysis and evaluation of monetary policy. In fact,
the NKPC is one of the structural-form equations in the so-called New Keynesian (NK) model.
Starting with Galí and Gertler (1999), many authors have estimated various specifications of
the NKPC — see, e.g., Galí, Gertler and López-Salido (2001, 2003, 2005), Rudd and Whelan
(2005, 2006) and Sbordone (2002, 2005, 2007).1 However, most available estimates are inferred
from a closed-economy context, usually employing the generalized method of moments (GMM)
to handle expectational terms. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the role of expected
fluctuations in the terms of trade for inflation dynamics in small open economies, based on
the small open-economy (SOE) version of the NKPC derived in Galí and Monacelli (2005),
henceforth the SOE NKPC. Notably, the SOE NKPC links inflation dynamics to external-
sector macro-variables, such as the terms of trade (ToT), in addition to domestic ones.
Our analysis is partly related to Leith and Malley (2007) and Rumler (2007), who also
estimate open-economy versions of the NKPC although in a less explicit way. In contrast
to our paper, these authors focus on parameters such as the degree of backward- and forward-
lookingness, the Calvo probability of a price change, and the degree of imperfect substitutability
between domestic and foreign intermediate inputs, without examining in more detail the role
of external-sector inflation drivers.2 The novel aspect in this paper is that we apply the open-
economy NKPC of Galí and Monacelli (2005) which allows us to analyze domestic and external
factors in determining CPI inflation dynamics.
We estimate several empirical specifications of the the open-economy NKPC derived in Galí
and Monacelli (2005) by GMM. We use data from a sample of ten OECD countries typically
classified as SOEs and covering the period since the early 1970s. We find that for most countries
in our sample, the expected relative change in the terms of trade emerges as a more relevant
factor driving CPI inflation than the contemporaneous domestic output gap. Therefore, we
conclude that the inflation rate in small open economies is indeed driven by expectations about
external factors to a substantial degree.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines our empirical strategy and
derives the estimating equation. Section 3 describes our data set while 4 presents our estimation
1Rudd and Whelan (2007) present a critical review of this literature.
2Razin and Yuen (2002) highlight the theoretical similarities and diﬀerences of closed- versus open-economy
NKPC formulations. Razin and Binyamini (2007) investigate empirical issues related to the flattening of the
inflation-output tradeoﬀ and whether this could be assigned to monetary policy or globalization.
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results. The last section concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Motivation and Empirical Strategy
Our analysis is based on the model described in Galí and Monacelli (2005). They show that
in a small open economy consumer-price inflation, πt is determined by domestic-price inflation,
πH,t ≡ pH,t−pH,t−1, and the change in the terms of trade, ∆st ≡ st−st−1, with st ≈ pF,t−pH,t,
where st is the (natural) log of the eﬀective ToT of the SOE vis-à-vis the rest of the world
and pH,t and pF,t are the (natural) logs of its domestic price index and import price index,
respectively.
In particular, the following equation holds as a log-linear approximation around the steady
state:3
πt = πH,t + α∆st, (1)
where α ∈ [0, 1] is inversely related to the degree of home bias in consumption preferences. The
equation states that the gap between consumer- and domestic-price inflation is proportional to
the per cent change of the terms of trade, with the coeﬃcient of proportionality given by the
index of openness. In other words, CPI inflation is determined by domestic-price inflation, a
domestic factor, and changes in the terms of trade, an external factor, which matter more the
more open the economy is.
A further implication of the Galí—Monacelli (2005) model is the following variant of the
NKPC:4
πt = βEtπH,t+1 + λcmct + α∆st. (2)
Equation (2) is analogous to the NKPC typically derived and estimated for a closed economy,
where cmct is real marginal cost in per cent deviation from its steady state value. Furthermore,
since (1) implies that EtπH,t+1 = Etπt+1 − αEt∆st+1 we can rewrite (2) as:
πt = β (Etπt+1 − αEt∆st+1) + λcmct + α∆st. (3)
After rearranging terms, we arrive at
πt = βEtπt+1 + λcmct + α (∆st − βEt∆st+1) . (4)
Since cmct can be shown to be proportional to the SOE’s output gap, xt, the NKPC for the
3For details, see Appendix A and Galí and Monacelli (2005).
4This equation follows directly from equations (14) and (32) in Galí and Monacelli (2005).
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SOE can alternatively also be expressed as,5
πt = βEtπt+1 + καxt + α (∆st − βEt∆st+1) , (5)
where κα ≡ λ (σα + ϕ), λ ≡ (1−βθ)(1−θ)θ , σα ≡
σ
(1−α)+αω , and ω ≡ σγ + (1− α) (ση − 1);
furthermore, σ is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption and
ϕ is an analogous parameter characterizing the intertemporal labor/leisure choice, θ is related
to the degree of price stickiness (as 1 − θ is the probability of adjusting prices in a Calvo
(1983) setting, 0 < β ≡ 11+ρ < 1 is the standard time discount factor, with ρ being the time
discount rate, and η > 0 is the intratemporal substitutability in consumption between the SOE’s
domestically-produced and imported goods.
According to (5), CPI inflation is driven by the domestic output gap, expected next-period
CPI inflation and the expected, discounted change in the terms of trade relative to the observed
past-to-current period ToT change. Intuitively, an expected improvement in the ToT in the next
relative to the current period (∆st > βEt∆st+1) would increase current demand for domestic
goods because their price is relatively lower than what is expected in the future and this increased
demand exerts upward pressure on current inflation. This pressure is stronger the higher is
the degree of openness to trade, α. Inversely, an expected deterioration of the ToT in the
next relative to the current period (∆st < βEt∆st+1) would lower current-period demand for
domestic goods as agents expect their relative price to decline in the future and thus exerts
downward pressure on current inflation. This pressure is stronger the higher the degree of
openness to trade. Evaluating empirically the role of this forward-looking relative ToT change
channel in inflation dynamics as reflected in the SOE NKPC constitutes the novelty of our
approach relative to the existing literature.
Our empirical analysis is based on equations (4) and (5). Since the ToT enter explicitly
along with domestic drivers of CPI inflation, these two equations are a natural starting point
for a comparison of domestic and external factors relevant for inflation dynamics. More specif-
ically, we apply GMM estimation since, under rational expectations, (4) and (5) imply sets of
orthogonality conditions.
Although our analysis bears some resemblance to the studies by Leith and Malley (2007)
and Rumler (2007), in our model the open-economy elements enter as a separate expression in
5Theoretically defined as the deviation of the sticky-price output level from the output level when all prices
are perfectly flexible; empirically measured most frequently as the deviation of actual output from ‘potential’
output proxied by trend output, as we do and explain further down.
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the NKPC while in their model they are included in the marginal cost measure. Thus, while
we use the output gap and real unit labor cost as proxies for marginal cost, depending on the
specification, they use a marginal cost measure that accounts for open-economy factors, i.e. real
unit labor cost adjusted for imported intermediate inputs prices. Hence, external factors figure
more prominently in our analysis.
3 Data Description
We estimate equations (4) and (5) for ten advanced OECD countries which are typically classi-
fied as small open economies (and also selected according to data availability and to maximize
comparability): Austria, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. We include France, Germany and the UK even if they
are not small countries since they are fairly open and interdependent in terms of consumption
structure, whereas we do not consider the US and Japan which have a much lower import share
in consumption.
All data (for the CPI, GDP and the import and export prices for the construction of the
terms of trade as well as compensation to employees) stem from the Economic Outlook (ECO)
database of the OECD. In each specification, the dependent variable is quarter-on-quarter CPI
inflation. In estimating specification (5), we employ two diﬀerent proxies for the output gap,
namely the deviation of real GDP from a Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) trend, and its deviation from a
quadratic-polynomial (Q-P) trend.6 To solve the well-known endpoint problem of any one-sided
filtering method, the H-P and Q-P trend have been calculated including forecast values up to
2009:4 available at the ECO database. The H-P output gap has additionally been normalized
by its standard deviation to ensure comparable magnitudes across countries.
In line with the approaches implemented with respect to the closed-economy NKPC, notably
following Galí and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002), we also estimate specification (4) using
average real unit labor costs as a proxy for real marginal costs instead of the output gap.
Empirically, average real unit labor cost is proxied by the labor share in income, WlPy , where W
is hourly compensation, l total hours worked, y real output and P a measure of the (relevant)
price level.7 We construct this variable by dividing total nominal compensation to employees
6These commonly applied empirical measures of the output gap are, certainly, only imperfect proxies to the
theoretically relevant output gap. The underlying detrending procedures, which postulate a specific functional
form to separate the trend (or potential) real GDP from the cyclical component, are sometimes referred to as
‘naive’ in the literature. The alternatives in applied work, though, are not obvious.
7Most empirical studies have found a negative correlation between the labor share in income and the tra-
ditional, ‘naive’ measures of the output gap. For that reason, the notorious problem of wrongly signed (i.e.,
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by nominal GDP. As detrending method we use the Q-P trend in this case.
To construct the eﬀective ToT, st, which in our model corresponds to pF,t−pH,t, we calculate
- assuming producer’s currency pricing - the log diﬀerence of the import prices (given by the
import deflator) and the export prices (given by the export deflator) for each country. Implicitly,
this ratio gives the eﬀective ToT because the importance of the trading partners is automatically
reflected in the deflators.
Our data covers the period from the first quarter of 1970 to the last quarter of 2007, where
the samples vary somewhat due to limited data availability for some countries. All estimations
are from 1970:1 to 2007:4, with the following exceptions. For Austria, all data are available only
from 1980 on. Specification (4) is estimated from 1975 for Italy and from 1980 for Spain because
compensation of employees is available only from these respective years on. For Switzerland,
specification (4) could not be estimated due to the lack of quarterly data on compensation.
The instruments used in the GMM estimation have been chosen for each country individu-
ally. We do not restrict instrument sets to be identical across countries since inflation dynamics
may - to some extent - be country-specific. As it is standard in the literature, the instru-
ment sets mainly consist of lags of the right-hand-side variables in equations (4) and (5). In
addition to lagged regressors, we use commodity prices and the bilateral USD/EUR exchange
rate as instruments for some countries which also proved informative for future inflation. The
instruments should be correlated with the right-hand-side variables but uncorrelated with the
residuals of the equation implying a set of orthogonality conditions. We choose the specific lag
structure of the instruments according to these two criteria, where we use the J-test to test
the validity of the overidentifying restrictions. The complete set of instrumental variables by
country and econometric specification is provided in Appendix C.
4 Estimation Results
In this section we present our estimation results for equations (4) and (5). We start with (5)
as our main specification as it is the most intuitive and straightforward to estimate. We proxy
the output gap, xt, by the deviation of real GDP from its H-P trend.
Table 1 shows the results. The p-values associated with the J-test statistics are reported in
the last column. The null of the validity of the overidentifying restrictions cannot be rejected
at standard levels of significance.
statistically significant and negative) output gaps found in the data has been often avoided by employing the
labor share as a proxy for real marginal costs; see Galí and Gertler (1999) and Galí, Gertler and López-Salido
(2001).
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[Table 1 about here]
We see that the time discount factor β is statistically significant in all countries and the
point estimate is slightly below unity, except for Italy and France. For these two countries we
estimate β to be only marginally above unity.8
Turning to κα, the parameter that measures the impact of the output gap on inflation, we
see that this parameter is significantly greater than zero only in France and the UK. For Sweden,
the point estimate for κα is significantly negative. Intuitively, higher output gaps are associated
with an increase in marginal costs, which translate into price pressure. Therefore, one would
expect κα to be generally positive. However, as we demonstrate in Appendix B, this need not
be the case in the model in Galí and Monacelli (2005). Moreover, several authors argue that a
shortcoming of the standard New Keynesian framework is that it does not allow for a trade-oﬀ
between inflation and output stabilization.9 Thus, it might be the case that despite the fact
that our estimated equation is based on a model which does not generally allow for this type
of trade-oﬀ, our estimate for κα actually picks up the eﬀect of real rigidities insofar these are
present in the data. In any case, in the majority of the countries in our sample the output gap
turns out to be insignificant, which casts some doubt on the importance of domestic factors for
inflation dynamics in small open economies relative to external factors, as we claim below. Yet,
‘wrongly’ (i.e., negatively) signed or insignificant output gaps are known to have plagued the
closed-economy empirical NKPC literature too (see Rudd and Whelan, 2007).
Our estimates for α, the parameter we are mostly interested in, are positive and significant
at standard levels for half of the countries in our sample: namely, at the 1% level for Germany,
the Netherlands, the UK and Switzerland, and at the 10% level for Canada. Thus, external
factors appear to be more relevant than the domestic output gap as inflation divers in the
small open economies in our sample. Recall that in Galí and Monacelli (2005) α corresponds
to the share of domestic consumption allocated to imported goods in the steady state. Clearly,
a negative estimate for α is inconsistent with this interpretation. Thus, it appears that the
model in Galí and Monacelli (2005) does not fully capture all factors influencing the impact of
terms of trade fluctuations on inflation dynamics. A particularly relevant such factor seems the
pricing behavior of exporting firms. As mentioned, the Galí-Monacelli (2005) model is based on
8This is not uncommon in the empirical NKPC literature employing GMM: e.g., Rudd and Whelan (2007),
Table 1, p. 159, similarly report discount factors slightly higher than unity for quarterly US estimates over
1960:1—2004:3.
9Blanchard and Galí (2007) dub this property the ‘divine coincidence’: stabilizing the welfare-relevant output
gap at the same time stabilizes inflation. They explain it with the absence of real imperfections in the NK
framework and show that once real wage rigidity is introduced the property holds no longer.
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full producer currency pricing. However, if prices are actually set according to local currency
pricing in some proportion, then our estimates of α may be aﬀected by this feature, itself likely
to be highly country-specific. Note also that the degree of trade openness we estimate ranges
from 14% (Canada, which is, inversely, a home bias of 86%) to 48% (UK, i.e., a home bias of
52%).
In short, we conclude that expected relative variations in the terms of trade appear to be an
important driver of CPI inflation in the majority of countries under consideration. Moreover,
the impact of domestic factors on inflation dynamics, summarized by the output gap, come out
to be of less importance. To be more precise, the output gap is statistically significant at the 5%
level for three out of ten countries, namely, France, the UK and Sweden. Only in the UK both
the expected relative ToT change and the current output gap are simultaneously significant,
together with expected next-period CPI inflation as the third factor in our main estimating
equation (5). Nevertheless, for three countries, Austria, Italy and Spain, we find that neither
the output gap, nor the terms of trade change turn out to be significant.
[Table 2 about here]
As a next step in our analysis, we re-estimate (5) but this time with the output gap calculated
as deviation of real GDP from a quadratic-polynomial (Q-P) trend. Table 2 demonstrates a
slight improvement of our results in terms of our estimates for α. In addition to being rather
robust to this modification, the outcome from this latter estimation also yields a sixth country,
Italy, where the expected relative ToT change now becomes statistically significant at the 10%
level and acquires a plausible positive magnitude of 0.31. However, the above improvement
comes at some cost: when estimating (5) with Q-P instead of H-P filtering, the output gap
coeﬃcient, κα, turns out to be insignificant in all countries in the sample except France. As
before, the estimated β’s are all significant at the 1% level and show plausible values.
Recall from Section 2 that κα in (5) is a convolution of the primitive parameters of the
model. In this sense, κα can be interpreted as a ‘reduced-form’ parameter. Thus, our estimations
so far were essentially ‘semi-structural’ in the sense that although our estimating equation is
motivated by the theory, we do not identify all primitive parameters of the model. In particular,
α enters the construction of κα. Thus, by treating κα and α as independent coeﬃcients in our
estimations, we do not take into account that the theory puts a restriction on these parameters.
Note, however, that the parameter we are most interested in, α, is a primitive parameter.
Nevertheless, to properly account for this restriction imposed by the theory, we now estimate
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the structural parameters of the model.
In order to be able to identify all the structural parameters we are interested in, we need to
calibrate the remaining parameters. In particular, we set σ = 1, γ = 1, ϕ = 3 and η = 4, which
appear to be widely accepted in the literature (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2001) and are largely
chosen in accordance with the calibration in Galí and Monacelli (2005).10
Table 3 shows the estimates for the structural parameters. In addition to β and α we now
also obtain estimates for the Calvo parameter θ. Although our estimates for θ imply a higher
degree of price rigidity than commonly found in micro studies on price setting, our results are
quite in line with the literature on the standard NKPC (see e.g. Galí and Gertler, 1999), but
our estimates are somewhat higher than in papers where the standard model has been refined
by introducing real frictions.11
When we compare our results to those in the related papers of Leith and Malley (2007) and
Rumler (2007) for their specifications of the NKPC, we see that our estimates for θ are only in a
comparable range for Germany and France.12 For the remaining countries they are consistently
lower in those papers.
[Table 3 about here]
We also see from the table that the coeﬃcient estimates for α closely match those presented
in Table 2. Overall, the results in Table 3 support our previous conclusion that terms of trade
dynamics are an important source of variation in CPI inflation in small open economies.
It is well known that the output gap and marginal costs do not need to be proportional,
whereas our estimated equation (5) relies on the assumption that they are indeed. Galí and
Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2002) were among the first to argue that a more general approach
would be to use average real unit labor costs to proxy marginal costs.
[Table 4 about here]
10Note that our calibration of η diﬀers from Galí and Monacelli (2005) who use η = 1. Their calibration,
however, creates a special case where the restriction of α appearing in the reduced-form coeﬃcient is eliminated.
Because we want to estimate this additional restriction, we have to adopt a value for η diﬀerent from 1. Fur-
thermore, it is more plausible that η is greater rather than smaller than 1 (see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 2001). As
a robustness check, we used alternative plausible values for all calibrated parameters. Our results proved to be
quite robust to changes in the calibrated values.
11 It has been shown that introducing real frictions into the model such as firm-specific capital (as in Woodford,
2005) or decreasing returns to scale in the production function (as in Galí et al., 2001) leads to lower estimates
of θ for a given reduced-form coeﬃcient.
12See tables 1 in Leith and Malley (2007) and in Rumler (2007).
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Thus, we proceed by estimating equation (4) directly, where we proxy cmct by the average real
unit labor costs. We see from Table 4 that this modification leads to rather similar outcomes.
Now λ is still insignificant (in nine out of the ten economies in our sample) or wrongly signed
(for the UK, the only country where it comes out significant, at the 1% level). On the other
hand, we get estimates for α that are statistically significant at the 1% level and plausible in four
cases (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK). Overall, for the remaining six countries
in the sample we find that neither the current-period labor share in income, nor the expected
next-period change in the terms of trade relative to that observed since the past period matter
for the dynamics of the CPI inflation rate. Thus, this specification performs relatively worse,
which is in line with the criticism in Rudd and Whelan (2007).
As an additional robustness check, we present the estimated primitive parameters of equation
(4) in Table 5. Again, as for equation (5) we find that the results of the structural estimation
of equation (4) broadly match those obtained for the semi-structural estimation.
[Table 5 about here]
Note that the specifications estimated so far impose rather strong theoretical restrictions
on how the terms of trade enter and influence inflation dynamics. In particular, the parameter
β determines how expected inflation, and the expected ToT enter into (4) and (5). Moreover,
since β is close to unity in most cases, the last term in (5) resembles the second diﬀerence of the
terms of trade. Empirically, the second diﬀerence of the ToT behaves very much like white noise
in most countries. This could be one reason why the estimates of α turn out to be insignificant
or negatively signed in some of the countries. Thus, regardless of the theoretical justification
in Galí and Monacelli (2005), as an additional robustness analysis we estimate an alternative
specification motivated on empirical grounds (only) which replaces (∆st − βEt∆st+1) simply
by ∆st. Of course, this additional specification does not allow to interpret the coeﬃcients on
the output gap and on the terms of trade in a structural way.
[Table 6 about here]
Table 6 shows the results. We see that this less restrictive specification delivers broadly
similar results. In particular, now the first diﬀerence of the terms of trade comes out significant
in six countries, whereas the output gap is significantly diﬀerent from zero in three countries.
[Tables 7 and 8 about here]
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To further cross-check our findings, we compare our open-economy results to what we obtain
based on closed-economy specifications. More specifically, we estimate a purely forward-looking
and a hybrid version of the closed-economy NKPC. For the hybrid specification we add the
lagged inflation rate as an additional explanatory variable.
The results based on the purely forward-looking closed-economy NKPC in Table 7 show
a positive and significant coeﬃcient on the output gap for four out of ten countries, which
is a marginally better performance than in our baseline specification in Table 1. From this
finding we may conclude that the inclusion of expected relative ToT fluctuations in the SOE
specification of the NKPC may slightly contribute to the loss of significance of the output gap.
For the hybrid model, in contrast, the results for the output gap — shown in Table 8 — do not
improve compared to the SOE NKPC estimation in Table 1. Thus, in our sample, including
lagged inflation in the NKPC does not solve the problem of insignificant or wrongly signed
output gap coeﬃcients often found in the literature.13
In short, these cross-checks reassure us that terms of trade fluctuations are a non-negligible
source of inflation dynamics in small open economies. As an additional dimension of our analysis,
we estimate (5) over subsamples. This dimension is motivated by a number of recent studies
which discuss the potential implications of the ongoing process of globalization for inflation
dynamics (see, e.g., Rogoﬀ, 2003 and 2006, among others). Borio and Filardo (2007) and White
(2008) argue that due to increased openness and the resulting increase in trade and financial
flows, traditional domestic factors have become less important in determining inflation. The
opposite strand of the literature — e.g., Ball (2006), Woodford (2007), Mishkin (2007, 2009) —
concludes that there is no evidence for a strong eﬀect of globalization in determining domestic
inflation.
We perform the estimations for the two subsamples 1970:1—1986:4 and 1987:1—2007:4.14 We
choose this particular approach since it splits our sample in equal halves and also because the
late 1980s saw substantial financial liberalizations and increases in international trade. For
Germany we choose the sample split date to be 1991, i.e., the two subsamples are 1970:1—1990:4
and 1991:1—2007:4, because of the break induced by the German re-unification. Since data for
Austria start in 1980 and due to its close economic links with Germany, we choose the break
date for Austria to be 1991 as well.
13Additionally estimating the SOE NKPC in an empirically motivated hybrid form, i.e. adding a lagged
inflation term in equation (5), does not deliver a better fit than the original SOE NKPC. In particular, our main
conclusion that the external inflation driver is more relevant for explaining inflation than the domestic output
gap survives also in this estimation. The results are available upon request.
14The instruments are the same in the estimations of the two subsamples.
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Tables 9 and 10 show the results for the subperiods. We report only the estimates for the
specification with H-P detrended real GDP as a proxy for the output gap. Results obtained
for the other specifications are qualitatively similar.15 Comparing the estimates for κα across
subsamples shows that the output gap becomes somewhat less important as a driving force of
inflation over time. In the first subsample κα is significantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level
in five countries. In the second subsample, we find only three countries where the output gap
enters significantly at the 5% level, while the latter has lost significance in all five countries of
the first subsample. In Switzerland the output gap is only significant at the 10% level, coming
out as positive at 0.10, whereas being negative at −0.14 in the earlier subperiod. Thus, if at all
there is a pattern in our results, we find some indications for a slightly reduced sensitivity of
CPI inflation dynamics to domestic output gaps overall in our sample, which is roughly in line
with Borio and Filardo (2007) and White (2008).
[Tables 9 and 10 about here]
For α, however, we find a similarly inconclusive pattern. In the later subsample α is signif-
icantly diﬀerent form zero in three countries, compared to five countries in the earlier sample.
Note as well that, numerically, we obtain larger point estimates in the second subsample for all
three economies where α is significantly greater than zero. More precisely, α has risen across the
subperiods studied from 0.07 in the 1970s and the 1980s to 0.14 in the 1990s and the 2000s in
Italy, from 0.47 to 0.84 in the UK and from 0.21 to 0.27 in the Netherlands. With no overwhelm-
ing evidence of globalization eﬀects along these estimates in our sample, the latter trends are
perhaps indicative for a potential role of country-specific features at the level of production and
trade structures as well as of policy and institutional mechanisms in explaining the divergence of
the mentioned three countries from the other countries in our sample. In two countries, Austria
and Germany, α actually decreased in the later subperiod relative to the earlier one, in Sweden
it increased but lost its significance, and in the other four countries it remained insignificant.
Thus, although the economies in our sample may have become more open over time, we do
not find that changes in the expected relative ToT have become a more important determinant
of inflation dynamics in the majority of countries. Yet, whereas the number of countries for
which the terms of trade are a key determinant of inflation dynamics has decreased, its rel-
ative importance in the economies of our sample where it remains relevant (three cases) has
considerably increased.
15We also estimated specifications where GDP is detrended using a Q-P trend and where unit labor costs
replace the output gap. These results are available upon request.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we explore the role of terms of trade fluctuations for inflation dynamics. Our
analysis is based on the small open-economy version of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
derived in Galí and Monacelli (2005). The SOE NKPC contains an additional explicit term
capturing ToT fluctuations, and hence allows a comparison of the relevance of domestic versus
external factors as driving forces of CPI inflation dynamics. For most economies in the sample
we considered, expected relative changes in the ToT turned out to be a more important CPI
inflation driver than the contemporaneous domestic output gap. Evaluating empirically the
role of this forward-looking relative ToT change channel for inflation dynamics is the main
contribution of our paper.
Note that although our emphasis is on the quantification of domestic versus external factors
driving dynamics, our analysis can also be viewed as a test of the underlying theory to a certain
extent. For most countries and in most specifications parameter estimates fall within ranges
that are admissible from the point of view of the theory, which provides some support in favor of
the model. However, although our results suggest that terms of trade fluctuations drive inflation
dynamics, we also find that the terms of trade and the domestic output gap are simultaneously
significant only in a few cases. Put diﬀerently, the idea that inflation dynamics are jointly
determined by domestic and external factors receives only limited support in our analysis.
Our estimates are not conclusive either concerning the potential eﬀects of globalization on
inflation dynamics, although we find that for about one-third of the countries in our sample the
role of external factors does seem to have increased in quantitative terms over time. Needless
to say, globalization may not be the only factor contributing to this outcome. Factors such as
the specific size, production structure and/or trade patterns of a particular country may have
contributed, in addition to global trends, to a stronger or weaker influence of external versus
domestic factors. Separating out and quantifying the eﬀects along these dimensions, as well as
other refinements of our initial broad estimates reported here, constitute interesting avenues for
further theoretical and empirical research. More disaggregated data and alternative modeling
of the pricing behavior of firms or of real rigidities in an international model environment are
also among the areas for future exploration.
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A CPI Inflation and the Terms of Trade
As Galí and Monacelli (2005) point out, equation (1) holds in approximation since the eﬀective
(i.e., multilateral) terms of trade of the SOE are, more precisely, defined by
St ≡
PF,t
PH,t
=
⎛
⎝
1Z
0
S1−γi,t di
⎞
⎠
1
1−γ
,
where γ > 0 measures the substitutability between goods produced in diﬀerent countries other
than the SOE indexed by i (and, thus, entering its import-price index), which can be approxi-
mated (up to first order) by the log-linear expression
st =
1Z
0
si,tdi.
Moreover, log-linearization of the CPI Dixit—Stiglitz (1977) constant elasticity of substitution
aggregator common to such frameworks,
Pt ≡
h
(1− α)P 1−ηH,t + αP
1−η
F,t
i 1
1−η
,
where η > 0 is the substitutability between the SOE’s domestically-produced and imported
goods (i.e., those produced in the rest of the world), around a symmetric steady state satisfying
the purchasing power parity condition, PH,t = PF,t under assumed full producer currency pricing
and S = 1, implies
pt ≡ pH,t + αst. (6)
The last expression above, taken in diﬀerences, in fact leads to (1).
B Theoretically Expected Sign of κα
From the signs of the enumerated components in the definition of κα in the SOE NK model of
Galí and Monacelli (2005), two general cases and one special case stand out.
The first general case is where ση > 1, i.e., the product of the inverse of the intertemporal
substitutability in consumption of the aggregate SOE’s consumption index, σ > 0, and the
intratemporal substitutability in consumption between domestically-produced and imported
goods entering that index, η > 0, is larger than unity. In this case,
ω ≡ σγ + (1− α) (ση − 1)| {z }
>1
> 0
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so that
σα ≡
σ
(1− α) + α ω|{z}
>0
> 0
and clearly then
κα ≡ λ
⎛
⎝ σα|{z}
>0
+ ϕ
⎞
⎠ > 0.
The special case is where ση = 1, implying ω ≡ σγ > 0 too and, hence, again σα > 0 and finally
κα > 0. These two cases, the general and the special ones, both imply κα > 0. In the context of
such parameter values, namely, ση ≥ 1 leading to κα > 0, therefore, the theoretically expected
sign of the output gap is unambiguously positive.
However, the second general case arises where ση < 1. In this case,
ω ≡ σγ|{z}
+
+ (1− α)| {z }
+
(ση − 1)| {z }
−
so that if
σγ|{z}
+
> (1− α)| {z }
+
(1− ση)| {z }
+
⇔ γ
1− α + η > σ
−1
then κα > 0, as before, but if the opposite is true, i.e.,
γ
1− α + η < σ
−1
then ω < 0, so that
σα ≡
+z}|{
σ
(1− α)| {z }
+
+ αω|{z}
−
and if, further,
α− 1| {z }
−
< αω|{z}
−
then σα > 0 and so κα > 0, as before, but if the opposite is true, i.e.,
α− 1| {z }
−
> αω|{z}
−
then σα < 0 and
κα ≡ λ|{z}
+
⎛
⎝ σα|{z}
−
+ ϕ|{z}
+
⎞
⎠
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so that if |σα| < |ϕ|, then κα > 0, as before, but if the opposite is true, i.e., |σα| > |ϕ|, then
κα < 0. The long chain of ‘ifs’ indicates that the case of κα < 0 is less probable — or may be
even not plausible for appropriately chosen parameter values — than the case of κα > 0 in the
SOE NK model of Galí and Monacelli (2005).
C Instrumental Variables Used in the Estimated Regressions
In addition to the instruments below, each instrument set includes also a constant.
In Table 1:
Austria: CPI inflation lags 1 to 4, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 4, change in terms of
trade lags 1 to 6;
Germany: CPI inflation lags 1 to 6, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 4, change in terms of
trade lags 1 to 4;
Italy: CPI inflation lags 1 to 4, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 4, change in terms of trade
lags 1 to 4;
France: CPI inflation lags 1 to 4, real unit labor costs lags 1 to 6, change in terms of trade lags
1 to 4;
Spain: CPI inflation lags 1 to 4, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 6, change in terms of trade
lags 1 to 4;
Netherlands: CPI inflation lags 1 to 4, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 4, change in terms of
trade lags 1 to 6;
UK: CPI inflation lags 1 to 6, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 6, change in terms of trade lags
1 to 4;
Canada: CPI inflation lags 1 to 4, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 6, change in terms of trade
lags 1 to 6;
Sweden: CPI inflation lags 1 to 6, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 4, change in terms of trade
lags 1 to 4;
Switzerland: CPI inflation lags 1 to 6, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 4, change in terms of
trade lags 1 to 4.
In Table 2:
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As in Table 1, except with Q-P filtered output gap instead of H-P filtered output gap.
In Table 3:
As in Table 1.
In Table 4:
As in Table 1, except with real unit labor costs instead of H-P filtered output gap.
In Table 5:
As in Table 4.
In Table 6:
As in Table 1.
In Table 7:
Austria: CPI inflation lags 1 to 6, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 6, change in the bilat-
eral USD/EUR (national currency before 1999) exchange rate lags 1 to 4;
Germany: CPI inflation lags 1 to 6, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 4, change in the HWWA
commodity price index lags 1 to 4;
Italy: CPI inflation lags 1 to 4, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 4, terms of trade lags 1 to 4;
France: CPI inflation lags 1 to 4, real unit labor costs lags 1 to 6, change in terms of trade lags
1 to 4;
Spain: CPI inflation lags 1 to 4, real unit labor costs lags 1 to 6, change in the HWWA com-
modity price index lags 1 to 4;
Netherlands: CPI inflation lags 1 to 6, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 4, change in the bilat-
eral USD/EUR (national currency before 1999) exchange rate lags 1 to 4;
UK: CPI inflation lags 1 to 6, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 6, change in terms of trade lags
1 to 4;
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Canada: CPI inflation lags 1 to 6, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 6, change in import prices
lags 1 to 6;
Sweden: CPI inflation lags 1 to 6, real unit labor costs lags 1 to 6, change in the bilateral
USD/SEK exchange rate lags 1 to 6;
Switzerland: CPI inflation lags 1 to 6, H-P filtered output gap lags 1 to 4, change in the bilateral
USD/CHF exchange rate lags 1 to 4.
In Table 8:
As in Table 7, except that CPI inflation starts at lag 2 instead of 1.
In Table 9:
As in Table 1.
In Table 10:
As in Table 1.
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Table 1: Estimates of the SOE NKPC
β p-value κα p-value α p-value p(J)
Austria 0.87 *** 0.00 0.00 1.00 -0.27 0.10 0.43
Germany 0.97 *** 0.00 0.02 0.53 0.17 *** 0.00 0.51
Italy 1.01 *** 0.00 0.06 0.26 0.06 0.10 0.53
France 1.05 *** 0.00 0.19 ** 0.02 -0.08 0.31 0.42
Spain 0.99 *** 0.00 0.01 0.70 -0.01 0.54 0.77
Netherlands 0.94 *** 0.00 0.01 0.79 0.28 *** 0.00 0.30
UK 0.87 *** 0.00 0.18 ** 0.02 0.48 *** 0.00 0.46
Canada 0.99 *** 0.00 0.04 0.28 0.14 * 0.07 0.72
Sweden 0.93 *** 0.00 -0.14 ** 0.03 0.01 0.60 0.54
Switzerland 0.93 *** 0.00 0.02 0.67 0.24 *** 0.03 0.35
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients for equation (5). The estimation period is 1970:1—2007:4 (except for
Austria: 1980:1—2007:4). The stars attached to the coeﬃcient estimates show significance levels, where
∗ denotes significance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
Table 2: Estimates of the SOE NKPC with Q-P Filtered Output Gap
β p-value κα p-value α p-value p(J)
Austria 0.89 *** 0.00 0.02 0.52 -0.26 0.12 0.44
Germany 0.98 *** 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.18 *** 0.00 0.54
Italy 1.01 *** 0.00 0.02 0.31 0.06 * 0.08 0.60
France 1.01 *** 0.00 0.12 * 0.01 -0.06 0.40 0.42
Spain 0.99 *** 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.70 0.76
Netherlands 0.94 *** 0.00 0.01 0.36 0.29 *** 0.00 0.32
UK 0.86 *** 0.00 0.04 0.23 0.47 *** 0.00 0.36
Canada 0.99 *** 0.00 0.01 0.44 0.15 * 0.07 0.72
Sweden 0.95 *** 0.00 -0.02 0.20 0.01 0.62 0.52
Switzerland 0.91 *** 0.00 0.01 0.47 0.25 *** 0.02 0.36
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients for equation (5). The estimation period is 1970:1—2007:4 (except for
Austria: 1980:1—2007:4). The stars attached to the coeﬃcient estimates show significance levels, where
∗ denotes significance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
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Table 3: Estimates of Structural Parameters of the SOE NKPC
β p-value θ p-value α p-value p(J)
Austria 0.87 *** 0.00 0.96 *** 0.00 -0.38 ** 0.02 0.43
Germany 0.97 *** 0.00 0.95 *** 0.00 0.17 *** 0.00 0.51
Italy 1.01 *** 0.00 0.88 *** 0.00 0.06 * 0.10 0.53
France 1.05 *** 0.00 0.79 *** 0.00 -0.08 0.30 0.42
Spain 0.98 *** 0.00 0.94 *** 0.00 -0.01 0.52 0.77
Netherlands 0.94 *** 0.00 0.97 *** 0.00 0.28 *** 0.00 0.30
UK 0.87 *** 0.00 0.84 *** 0.00 0.48 *** 0.00 0.46
Canada 0.98 *** 0.00 0.92 *** 0.00 0.15 ** 0.06 0.72
Sweden 0.97 *** 0.00 0.94 *** 0.00 0.01 0.46 0.23
Switzerland 0.93 *** 0.00 0.95 *** 0.00 0.25 ** 0.03 0.35
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients for equation (5). The estimation period is 1970:1—2007:4 (except for
Austria: 1980:1—2007:4). The stars attached to the coeﬃcient estimates show significance levels, where
∗ denotes significance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
Table 4: Estimates of the SOE NKPC with Labor Income Share
β p-value λ p-value α p-value p(J)
Austria 0.89 *** 0.00 -0.02 0.72 -0.02 0.91 0.40
Germany 0.97 *** 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.17 *** 0.00 0.54
Italy 1.02 *** 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.23 *** 0.02 0.73
France 0.98 *** 0.00 0.01 0.27 -0.04 0.52 0.20
Spain 1.00 *** 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.01 0.38 0.95
Netherlands 0.96 *** 0.00 0.01 0.54 0.28 *** 0.00 0.20
UK 0.81 *** 0.00 -0.10 *** 0.00 0.53 *** 0.00 0.27
Canada 0.99 *** 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.98 0.72
Sweden 0.93 *** 0.00 -0.02 0.24 0.01 0.61 0.46
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients for equation (4). The estimation period is 1970:1—2007:4 (except for Aus-
tria: 1980:1—2007:4; Italy: 1975:1—2007:4; Spain: 1980:1—2007:4). The stars attached to the coeﬃcient
estimates show significance levels, where ∗ denotes significance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the
1% level. Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
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Table 5: Estimates of Structural Parameters of the SOE NKPC with the Labor Income Share
β p-value θ p-value α p-value p(J)
Austria 0.90 *** 0.00 0.84 *** 0.00 0.06 0.69 0.29
Germany 0.97 *** 0.00 0.97 *** 0.00 0.17 *** 0.00 0.37
Italy 1.03 *** 0.00 1.01 *** 0.00 0.27 *** 0.00 0.76
France 0.97 *** 0.00 0.80 0.23 0.63 *** 0.00 0.24
Spain 1.00 *** 0.00 0.95 *** 0.00 0.01 0.33 0.90
Netherlands 0.96 *** 0.00 0.92 *** 0.00 0.28 *** 0.00 0.20
UK 0.97 *** 0.00 0.80 0.23 0.63 *** 0.00 0.24
Canada 1.01 *** 0.00 0.91 *** 0.00 0.15 ** 0.03 0.91
Sweden 0.95 *** 0.00 0.82 ** 0.04 0.01 0.60 0.42
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients for equation (4). The estimation period is 1970:1—2007:4 (except for
Austria: 1980:1—2007:4). The stars attached to the coeﬃcient estimates show significance levels, where
∗ denotes significance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
Table 6: Estimates of the SOE NKPC with the First Diﬀerence of the Terms of Trade
β∆ p-value κα∆ p-value α∆ p-value p(J)
Austria 0.89 *** 0.00 0.02 0.65 0.35 ** 0.02 0.45
Germany 0.95 *** 0.00 0.03 0.29 0.18 *** 0.00 0.33
Italy 1.01 *** 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.29 0.41
France 1.06 *** 0.00 0.15 ** 0.02 0.09 ** 0.02 0.67
Spain 0.99 *** 0.00 0.01 0.60 0.01 0.54 0.76
Netherlands 0.96 *** 0.00 -0.01 0.84 0.31 *** 0.00 0.19
UK 0.83 *** 0.00 0.30 *** 0.00 0.55 *** 0.00 0.32
Canada 1.00 *** 0.00 0.03 0.34 0.04 0.42 0.64
Sweden 0.92 *** 0.00 -0.14 ** 0.03 0.02 0.61 0.55
Switzerland 0.81 *** 0.00 -0.04 0.43 0.16 ** 0.03 0.25
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients for πt = β∆Etπt+1 + κα∆xt + α∆∆st. The estimation period is 1970:1—
2007:4 (except for Austria: 1980:1—2007:4). The stars attached to the coeﬃcient estimates show signif-
icance levels, where ∗ denotes significance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
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Table 7: Closed Economy NKPC
β p-value κ p-value p(J)
Austria 0.91 *** 0.00 0.04 0.28 0.53
Germany 0.99 *** 0.00 0.05 * 0.08 0.47
Italy 1.00 *** 0.00 0.12 ** 0.02 0.42
France 1.03 *** 0.00 0.13 ** 0.02 0.30
Spain 1.02 *** 0.00 0.05 0.22 0.84
Netherlands 0.97 *** 0.00 0.01 0.66 0.26
UK 0.81 *** 0.00 0.48 *** 0.00 0.21
Canada 1.00 *** 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.80
Sweden 1.00 *** 0.00 0.11 0.42 0.51
Switzerland 0.95 *** 0.00 -0.01 0.74 0.23
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients for πt = βEtπt+1+κxt. The estimation period is 1970:1—2007:4 (except for
Austria: 1980:1—2007:4). The stars attached to the coeﬃcient estimates show significance levels, where
∗ denotes significance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
Table 8: Hybrid Closed Economy NKPC
γf p-value γb p-value κ p-value p(J)
Austria 0.71 *** 0.00 0.29 *** 0.00 0.01 0.66 0.47
Germany 0.55 *** 0.00 0.44 *** 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.25
Italy 0.62 *** 0.00 0.38 *** 0.00 0.07 ** 0.04 0.29
France 0.40 *** 0.00 0.60 *** 0.00 -0.01 0.75 0.24
Spain 0.79 *** 0.00 0.23 0.32 0.06 0.10 0.74
Netherlands 0.54 *** 0.00 0.46 *** 0.00 0.01 0.75 0.19
UK 0.58 *** 0.00 0.23 *** 0.01 0.32 *** 0.00 0.13
Canada 0.67 *** 0.00 0.33 *** 0.00 0.04 * 0.07 0.66
Sweden 0.69 *** 0.00 0.33 *** 0.00 0.14 0.32 0.40
Switzerland 0.34 *** 0.00 0.62 *** 0.00 0.00 0.92 0.14
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients for πt = γfEtπt+1+ γbπt−1+κxt. The estimation period is 1970:1—2007:4
(except for Austria: 1980:1—2007:4). The stars attached to the coeﬃcient estimates show significance
levels, where ∗ denotes significance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Standard errors
are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
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Table 9: SOE NKPC: 1970:1—1986:4
β p-value κα p-value α p-value p(J)
Austria 0.30 *** 0.00 -0.56 *** 0.00 0.33 * 0.09 0.71
Germany 0.99 *** 0.00 0.07 ** 0.03 0.07 ** 0.04 0.77
Italy 1.00 *** 0.00 0.08 0.38 0.04 0.23 0.78
France 1.03 *** 0.00 0.10 ** 0.03 -0.04 0.37 0.72
Spain 0.98 *** 0.00 0.08 0.47 0.00 0.79 0.63
Netherlands 0.97 *** 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.21 ** 0.01 0.58
UK 0.90 *** 0.00 0.24 0.03 0.47 *** 0.00 0.80
Canada 0.98 *** 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.08 0.10 0.90
Sweden 0.91 *** 0.00 -0.44 *** 0.00 0.04 ** 0.06 0.63
Switzerland 0.86 *** 0.00 -0.14 ** 0.01 0.10 0.41 0.69
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients for equation (5). The estimation period is 1970:1—1986:4 (except for
Austria: 1980:1—1990:4; Germany: 1970:1—1990:4). The stars attached to the coeﬃcient estimates show
significance levels, where ∗ denotes significance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
Table 10: SOE NKPC: 1987:1—2007:4
β p-value κα p-value α p-value p(J)
Austria 0.96 *** 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.12 0.58 0.77
Germany 0.83 *** 0.00 -0.03 0.44 0.06 0.25 0.46
Italy 1.04 *** 0.00 0.01 0.80 0.14 ** 0.05 0.35
France 0.96 *** 0.00 0.01 0.71 0.01 0.91 0.25
Spain 0.99 *** 0.00 -0.05 ** 0.02 0.01 0.65 0.90
Netherlands 0.86 *** 0.00 -0.07 ** 0.03 0.27 *** 0.00 0.25
UK 0.72 *** 0.00 0.24 ** 0.03 0.84 *** 0.00 0.68
Canada 0.97 *** 0.00 0.02 0.65 0.05 0.40 0.91
Sweden 0.95 *** 0.00 0.01 0.89 0.05 0.48 0.55
Switzerland 1.03 *** 0.00 0.10 * 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.26
Notes: Estimated coeﬃcients for equation (5). The estimation period is 1987:1—2007:4 (except for Austria
and Germany: 1991:1—2007:4). The stars attached to the coeﬃcient estimates show significance levels,
where ∗ denotes significance at the 10%, ∗∗ at the 5% and ∗∗∗ at the 1% level. Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
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